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The mid-1980S witnessed the rise of grass roots protest in Kosovo, a peripheral 
region of socialist Yugoslavia. In contrast to the 1981 demonstrations, the interaction 
with the authorities unfolded largely without violence, and instead of Kosovo Albanians 
the protesters were now Kosovo Serbs.1 The grass roots movement emerged in 1985 and 
rapidly spread among Serbs in Serbia’s autonomous province with a Kosovo Albanian 
majority. In the summer of 1988 the movement triggered a wave of mobilisation across 
Serbia and Montenegro, which ended with Kosovo Albanian protestsinlate1988 and early 
1989.The movement has so far escaped the attention of scholars and journalists alike. For 
some, the movement was only an empty media fabrication of Slobodan Milošević in his 
drive to power in 1987 and 1988. For others, the grass roots protest, though genuine, had 
little impact on political developments in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, which were dictated 
by communist and dissident elites.2  
The argument offered in this article consists of two parts. In the historical part I 
provide evidence that the grass roots mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs predated the rise to 
power of Milošević and that, despite interaction, and sometimes co-operation, with the 
authorities the movement remained an autonomous political factor. I also show that the 
grass roots movement had a disproportionate impact on political developments in 
Yugoslavia in the late 1980s. Partly under the impact of the movement’s activities, long-
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existing divisions within and among political elites, including factional struggle within 
Serbia’s leadership and conflict among leaders of republics and autonomous provinces, 
turned into an open conflict. Moreover, the movement’s action opened the socialist 
regime for other non-state actors, which resulted in mobilisation across Serbia and 
Montenegro. Finally, the movement left a legacy of protest politics that affected 
strategies of subsequent challenger groups in the region.  
In the theoretical part of the argument I show that the rise, development and 
outcomes of nationalist movements cannot be fully explained without insights from social 
movement theory. Although I acknowledge the important role of ethnic grievances and 
national identities, I employ the concepts of social movement theory to demonstrate the 
central place of political context and the dynamics of contention in understanding 
nationalist movements. I provide evidence that the Kosovo Serb movement emerged and 
developed largely in response to changes in political context and within a political 
environment that was, in comparison with other socialist party-states in Eastern Europe, 
the least unfavourable to challenger groups. I also show that the development and 
outcomes of the movement largely depended on its protest strategies and the movement’s 
temporal location in a broader wave of mobilisation. Consequently, I argue that 
nationalist movements should be studied primarily as a species of social movements.  
 
The rise and fall of the grass roots movement of Kosovo Serbs 
 
In late October 1985 a petition from a large group of Kosovo Serbs was sent to 
both the federal and Serbia’s communist leadership. They expressed their grievances 
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about intimidation of, and discrimination against, Kosovo Serbs, and asked for the 
protection of their human rights and the establishment of law and order. They pointed out 
that Kosovo was becoming increasingly ‘ethnically clean’ of Serbs, accused the 
provincial government of tacit approval of forced migration of Serbs out of Kosovo and 
demanded that the federal and Serbia’s authorities bring that trend to a halt. The 
petitioners also insisted that their demands be at once put on the agenda of the federal and 
Serbia’s assemblies. The petition was a success. About 2000 people signed it straight 
away and by April 1986 the number of signatories had multiplied several times, which 
was much more than anybody had expected.3  
In the early 1980s Kosovo Serbs had voiced their grievances through institutions 
in vain. When it became apparent that the appeals were ignored, they shifted their efforts 
to building pressure from the grass roots. In 1985 a small group of political outsiders 
from Kosovo Polje, a suburb of Pristina with a Serb majority, started mobilising support 
among Kosovo Serbs for contentious action in order to put pressure on the authorities to 
take their problems seriously.4 The success of the October 1985 petition was partly a 
result of this initiative. Despite a resolute rejection of the demands and threats to 
organisers from the authorities, there was no immediate persecution, which encouraged 
the protesters to press their claims again. On a freezing winter morning in late February 
1986 a group of 95 people, many of whom were in peasant garb, turned up outside the 
Federal Assembly in Belgrade. These were informally selected representatives of Kosovo 
Serbs from 42 towns and villages from all parts of the autonomous province and they 
demanded to speak to the federal leadership. In the following meeting with top officials 
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they spoke at length about their problems and cited examples of mistreatment and 
discrimination.5  
In the mid-1980s the communist party (called the League of Communists) was 
still firmly in control of all levers of power and this was the first major demonstration of 
discontent after the 1981 demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians. The authorities took the 
threat seriously and arrested one of the organisers in early April. The tactics backfired. 
The arrest only alarmed Kosovo Serbs and brought them together in defiance of the 
authorities. They promptly organised protests outside the house of their arrested leader 
and within three days the number of protesters, coming from various parts of the 
autonomous province, rose to a few thousand. Ivan Stambolić, Serbia’s party leader, 
visited Kosovo Polje without delay and insisted that the party would solve the problems 
but that protesters should not listen to Serb nationalists, meaning informal leaders of the 
movement. Stambolić, however, failed to calm the protesters and, although their leader 
had already been released from prison, about 550 Kosovo Serbs, led by 80 year-old 
farmer Boža Marković from Batusi, showed up in Belgrade on the following morning. At 
the meeting with the highest federal and Serbia’s officials many people took the floor to 
voice their grievances about inter-ethnic inequalities and the lack of safety for Kosovo 
Serbs.6  
The key event in 1986 occurred on 20 June, a few days before the party congress, 
when several hundred Kosovo Serbs set off for central Serbia in tractors and cars. Feeling 
under increasing pressure from Kosovo Albanians and provoked by a few recent inter-
ethnic incidents, Serb farmers from Batusi, a village near Kosovo Polje, decided to 
collectively move out of Kosovo in protest. They left all their property untouched and 
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planned to set up a tent city somewhere in central Serbia. In this way they wanted to 
create an emergency situation which the authorities could not ignore. As their feelings 
fitted well the prevailing mood of Kosovo Serbs, some living in Metohija, in the eastern 
part of the province, promptly joined the protest. Since the police had already blocked 
most roads between eastern and central parts of Kosovo, many people, including 70 and 
80 year olds and children, proceeded on foot through woods and meadows. After a long 
march they reached Kosovo Polje, where local protesters joined the group. Just outside 
Kosovo Polje several high-ranking party officials tried to persuade people to return to 
their homes but the protesters did not listen. In the end, a cordon of police blocked the 
road and did not let the protesters go further. After several hours people gave up and 
quietly returned to their homes.7  
The demands of the movement were at first limited to issues related to law and 
order and inter-ethnic inequality, and were largely stated in terms of the official 
discourse. Protesters pointed to mistreatment of Serbs by the Kosovo Albanian majority 
in Kosovo, including killings, attacks, destroyed crops, seized property and various forms 
of discrimination based on ethnicity. Since they believed that local and Kosovo party 
officials deliberately avoided enforcing the law when it came to the rights of Serbs, they 
demanded their resignations and threatened to collectively leave Kosovo in protest. As 
divisions within and among officials of the federation, Serbia and Kosovo grew, the 
demands evolved towards constitutional issues. Between 1967 and 1974 there had been a 
major shift towards decentralisation in Yugoslavia: Kosovo and Vojvodina, earlier little 
more than administrative regions of Serbia, were granted a status similar to that of federal 
units and Serbia effectively lost jurisdiction in these parts of its territory. Since Kosovo 
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Serbs believed that Kosovo’s officials were not able, or did not want, to enforce the law 
when it came to the rights of Serbs, they asked that Kosovo should be brought back under 
the jurisdiction of Serbia’s authorities. They also demanded that consociational 
arrangements be put in place to give the minority population a say in ruling the province.8  
By late 1986 the movement came close to representing a majority of Serbs in 
Kosovo. Its main feature was its grass roots composition, because the managerial elite, 
intellectuals and professionals were largely co-opted by the party. A solid network of 
activists in towns and villages inhabited by Serbs was rapidly emerging although formal 
organisations could not be formed. Before the June march the public responses of federal, 
Serbia’s and Kosovo officials were all alike. After the show of commitment to proceed 
with disruptive action, however, the federal and Serbia’s leaderships were somewhat less 
inclined to refuse to listen to what the protesters were saying. Disputes between Serbia’s 
and Kosovo’s officials grew ever more frequent and increasing publicity was given to the 
movement’s demands and protest actions. Leaders of the movement continually appealed 
to and asked for support from federal and Serbia’s officials but were still without 
influential allies within the leadership. This was to change with the rising influence of 
Milošević´ within Serbia’s leadership.  
In the early 1980s Milošević, head of the largest Yugoslav bank, entered the 
higher party ranks in Serbia. He advanced rapidly within the top leadership, following in 
the steps of his political mentor and close friend Stambolić, and in 1986 became Serbia’s 
party leader.9 In April 1987 Milošević paid his first official visit to Kosovo and dropped 
in to Kosovo Polje. Quite unexpectedly, he faced a crowd of several thousand protesters 
who passionately chanted ‘We want freedom, we want freedom!’. In the chaos that 
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ensued the police started beating protesters with truncheons while they responded by 
throwing stones at policemen. Milošević then ordered the police to stop beating people 
and asked the protesters to maintain order themselves, which was accepted with ovations, 
and the meeting with their representatives continued until early morning. At the end, 
Milošević delivered a speech, in most part a typical speech of a high-ranking party 
official. His description of the problem and the need to address it, however, were cast in 
stronger language than was generally accepted by senior party-state officials.10  
Kosovo Serbs had never before turned out to protest in such numbers and the 
whole country was shocked by televised scenes of the police beatings of old farmers, 
workers and housewives, and their stories of suffering. Moreover, never before had a 
high-ranking party official publicly condemned the police and expressed his solidarity 
with demonstrators. Milošević’s stance in turn provoked criticism in the party and 
triggered open conflict between two factions within Serbia’s leadership. The cleavage 
within the leadership had existed since early 1986 when Stambolić sidelined some 
politicians from Tito’s old guard and installed his protégé Milošević as Serbia’s party 
leader. The move, at the time seen as an overwhelming victory for Stambolić, swiftly 
provoked strong resistance among his opponents, who now supported Milošević in an 
attempt to preserve their influence. The latter seized the opportunity and gradually 
established an independent power base. While not interested in the Kosovo problem 
before 1987, Milošević exploited it in the intra-party conflict. He believed that the 
Kosovo crisis, along with other pressing political and economic problems, could be 
resolved only if the party was united in embracing the course of action set by its 
leadership. The more inclusive approach of Stambolić and others did not fit into the 
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picture and the showdown between the two factions in September 1987 ended with 
Milošević’s takeover.11  
These developments turned the fortunes of the movement. Acceptance of some of 
the movement’s demands by Serbia’s party leader increased the movement’s visibility 
and protected its organisers from repression by federal and Kosovo officials. The protest 
organisers established contact with Milošević’s emissaries and provided suggestions on 
how to establish law and order in the province.12 The downside was that the protesters 
needed to proceed with caution in order not to lose their influential ally. Milošević thus 
gained influence over the protesters but this often did not translate into actions on the 
ground. The protest organisers by no means intended to stop collective action until their 
demands had been fully addressed and at times took action contrary to Milošević’s 
advice. In other cases they followed his instructions but were outvoted, or just ignored, in 
loose public meetings by other movement activists. Milošević in turn exploited the grass 
roots mobilisation for his own ends and often provoked activists to publicly denounce his 
opponents.13  
Having Serbia’s party leader for an ally, however, did not alter the situation on the 
ground. Owing to the substantial autonomy of Kosovo, Milošević could only appeal to 
political leaders of the autonomous province to implement the party’s policy on Kosovo, 
which they often chose to ignore. In response, the movement’s organisers launched 
another petition and sent a large delegation to the federal and Serbia’s assemblies in May 
1988.14 They warned that if there were no rapid improvements in the security situation 
thousands of Serbs would collectively leave Kosovo in protest. Milošević in turn 
demanded that the organisers prevent a mass exodus and warned them that the party 
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would regard it as counter-revolution.15 Fearing the prospect of loosing an influential ally 
and unable to calm people down, the movement’s organisers decided to stage a 
demonstration in Novi Sad, the administrative centre of Vojvodina, instead. In this way 
they wanted to let off steam and thereby reduce discontent among activists and supporters 
of the movement but also to protest against the leadership of Vojvodina, Serbia’s other 
autonomous province, and its veto on constitutional changes that would bring the two 
provinces back under the jurisdiction of Serbia’s authorities.16  
On 9 July several hundred Kosovo Serbs turned up in Novi Sad and marched to 
the city centre, defying the police, again against the advice of Milošević.17 A large crowd 
of locals gathered spontaneously in their support and, despite unsuccessful attempts by 
the police to prevent them joining the protest, demanded the resignation of Vojvodina’s 
top officials. The demonstration revealed that popular support for the leadership was 
minimal and encouraged the movement’s organisers to initiate more protests in 
Vojvodina. Local protesters then took over and attention shifted from the demands of 
Kosovo Serbs to the general discontent of the local population with their leaders. A wave 
of protests swept the province and the provincial leadership resigned in early October 
after being faced with a two-day protest of more than 100,000 people in Novi Sad.18  
In late August and early September the tide had spread to Montenegro and central 
Serbia. People went onto the streets to declare their support for Kosovo Serbs, rally 
against local power holders and support Milošević, who was quick to back popular 
mobilisation. In Serbia, more than three million people attended the rallies. In 
Montenegro, after initial rallies from August to October to which the authorities 
responded by repression, protests became overwhelming in January 1989 and the 
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leadership resigned. In November 1988 Kosovo Albanians initiated protests against the 
purge of Kosovo’s officials, which turned into a general strike in late February 1989. 
Although the protests were suppressed in March this was the beginning of a decade-long 
non-violent struggle by Kosovo Albanians.19 As the protests moved from Kosovo to other 
parts of Serbia and Montenegro, the movement of Kosovo Serbs gradually lost 
momentum. That their demands were now on the agenda of the government removed 
reasons for protest for most supporters of the movement and triggered conflict among its 
organisers. Milošević, who had now secured popular support, co-opted one of the 
organisers and forced others to either leave Kosovo or withdraw from public life.20  
 
Ethnic grievances and national identities 
 
Nationalism studies offer important tools for the study of nationalist mobilisation. 
Students of nationalism often highlight the sources of nationalist mobilisation and the 
power of collective identities to sustain collective action. One version of this approach 
puts emphasis on ancestral ethnic hatreds as the main source and glue of nationalist 
movements. Another stresses the central place of grievances that arise from inter-ethnic 
inequalities and memories of earlier conflicts, and national identities.21 In this section I 
acknowledge the contribution of the latter version of this approach and show that 
grievances rooted in historical ethnic antagonisms and contemporary inter-ethnic 
inequalities shaped mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, and that the movement’s survival 
partly depended on the power of national identity to keep protesters together in times of 
uncertainty. I show, however, that these factors do not account for the timing and 
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dynamics of nationalist movements and that political factors need to be taken seriously. 
As political scientists who study nationalism are mainly concerned with the relationship 
between various institutional settings and ethnic competition and various macro-political 
strategies of ethnic conflict regulation,22 in the following section I employ tools of social 
movement theory to explain the emergence and dynamics of nationalist movements.  
The modern history of Kosovo, a mixed Albanian–Serb region, can be read partly 
as a history of ethnic antagonisms.23 Serbs and Albanians had long lived as peaceful 
neighbours and often co-operated in the struggle against the Ottomans. Major sources of 
antagonism were differences in religion, in the context of the policy of discrimination 
against the Christian population that the Porte increasingly employed in the strategically 
important western fringes of the empire, and mutually exclusive nationalist goals of 
Albanians and Serbs in the second half of the nineteenth century. Ethnic tensions were 
exacerbated in the last decades of Ottoman rule, when Serbs suffered in the chaos during 
the decline of the empire, then in pre-war Yugoslavia, where Kosovo Albanians were 
discriminated against, and during World War II, when Serbs were terrorised by Italian 
and German-sponsored militant Albanian groups.  
The policy of the communist party towards Kosovo was a part of its broader 
approach to the national question. Before the war, struggle against the Serbian-style 
centralisation was a major task of the party, which under the influence of the Comintern 
at times extended to support for self-determination of ethnic groups, including minorities. 
Aware of the hostility of Kosovo Albanians towards the new regime, the communist 
leadership sought their co-operation. The new government granted a degree of autonomy 
to Kosovo, banned Serb settlers from returning to the region after being expelled during 
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the war, opened Albanian-language schools, encouraged cultural emancipation of Kosovo 
Albanians and increasingly financed development of the backward region.24 Some 
administrative restrictions on the rights of Kosovo Albanians remained for security 
reasons since Albania strongly supported the Soviet bloc against Yugoslavia in 1948, and 
Serbs remained disproportionately represented in the regional government and security 
apparatus.  
In the 1967–1974 constitutional reforms Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted 
status similar to that of federal units and Serbia effectively lost jurisdiction in these parts 
of its territory. Since most excesses of the security apparatus, which were underscored as 
the main reason for dismantling the centralised state, had occurred in Kosovo, and some 
thought this to be associated with disproportionate representation of Serbs, a policy of 
positive discrimination was introduced to change the ethnic composition of the public 
sector. With the shift to decentralisation and a relaxation of the strategy of suppression of 
the politicisation of ethnicity, few restraints on Kosovo’s political elite remained. The 
new ethnic composition of elites and employees in the huge public sector, coupled with 
decision making based on majority voting, swiftly turned the trend towards emancipation 
of Kosovo Albanians into full-scale domination over other ethnic groups. Various forms 
of inter-ethnic inequality were compounded by the lack of legal protection for Kosovo 
Serbs.25 On the whole, while winners and losers changed over time, the politics of inter-
ethnic inequality remained an important feature of political life in the region. From the 
perspective of a disadvantaged ethnic group the only way to escape a subordinate position 
was political action, which over the course of history meant wars and uprisings, 
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parliamentary initiatives and party building, struggles within the communist party and, 
ultimately, popular protest.  
Regarding the grievances of Kosovo Serbs, they faced a rapidly changing ethnic 
composition in the population of the region, part of which was caused by steady 
migration of Serbs out of the province. While the proportion of Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs in the population remained relatively stable in the period between 1948 and 1961 
(68.5–67.1% and 27.5% respectively), in the following two decades the proportion of the 
former increased from 67.1% to 77.4% and that of the latter decreased from 27.5% to 
14.9%,26 and continued to decline throughout the 1980s. Critical to the changes in ethnic 
composition of the population were demographic factors, the most important of which 
was a much higher rate of population growth of Kosovo Albanians than of Kosovo’s non-
Albanian population. This was the result of an extremely high birth rate among the 
former, by far the highest in Europe, and a steadily decreasing death rate attributable to 
improving health care services and the increasing share of young people in the Kosovo 
Albanian population. In turn, the main causes of the extremely high birth rate were 
underdevelopment and traditional characteristics of Kosovo Albanian society, especially 
the subordinate position of women.27 
The decreasing absolute numbers of Serbs and their shrinking territorial 
dispersion were caused by emigration. The 1981 Yugoslav census listed around 110,000 
Serbs from Kosovo living in other parts of Yugoslavia, of whom 85,000 had left the 
province between 1961 and 1981.28 By the late 1980s an additional 25,000–30,000 had 
left Kosovo. In other words, nearly a third of Kosovo Serbs had moved out of the 
autonomous provincesince1961. The.ndingsof a survey conducted in 1985–86 among 
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Serbs who had left Kosovo indicated that most left because of pressure on the basis of 
ethnicity. This included verbal pressure, pressure related to property, violence, trouble at 
work and inequalities in the public sector. What also emerged from the survey was that 
there was a clear territorial pattern of emigration largely resulting from the level of 
pressure and inequalities. The latter was inversely related to the proportion of Serbs in a 
settlement, and the critical point for a major increase in the pressure was if the Serb 
section of the population in a settlement dropped below 20–30%. This finding was 
compatible with evidence from the Yugoslav census that there was a strong trend towards 
emigration of Serbs from settlements where they accounted for a minority of less than 
30% of the population.29 Therefore, the decreasing proportion of Serbs in a settlement led 
to a sharp increase in pressure and inequalities, which in turn resulted in emigration.  
This finding points to the relative weight of various factors in causing emigration. 
Low-level pressure on Serbs as a minority group existed in the whole post-war period. 
This included insults, injuries and damage to property and religious and cultural 
monuments.30 That the number of complaints about intimidation sharply increased after 
the mid-to late-1960s, coinciding with a major political change towards the increased 
autonomy of Kosovo, indicates the role of the authorities in these developments. While 
open discriminatory policies were generally, though not always, avoided, most cases of 
intimidation and discrimination occurred because of the absence of legal protection for 
Kosovo Serbs. This in turn triggered a sharp increase in low-level intimidation on the 
ground. The latter was fostered, in addition to demographic pressure, by the 
consequences of the only partial modernisation of Kosovo Albanian society. The firm 
grip of traditional moral codes loosened under the pressure of modernisation while 
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national romanticism within this context brought about growing intolerance towards the 
minority population.  
Ethnic grievances were the main source of the grass roots mobilisation of Kosovo 
Serbs. The sources of protest, however, do not account for the timing and dynamics of 
mobilisation. The evidence from this case shows that nationalist movements do not 
emerge in response to an increase in the level of ethnic grievances. The level of 
inequalities facing Kosovo Serbs peaked in the 1970s but there were no protests at the 
time. In the mid-1980s their position was slowly improving but protests broke out 
nonetheless owing to a political context less antagonistic to collective action by this 
group. Similarly, the 1981 demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians were not preceded by an 
increase in the level of ethnic grievances. In fact, the protests erupted in a period more 
favourable to this ethnic group than any other after World War II.  
Another way to assess the relationship between ethnic grievances and the origins 
of nationalist mobilisation is to shift the focus from the level of grievances to the 
aggrieved group members’ perception of their position and feasible remedies for it. A 
social condition needs to be recognised as unjust or intolerable and deserving of 
corrective action in order to have any potential for mobilisation and it is collective action 
frames that shape grievances into broader and more resonant claims.31 Indeed, in contrast 
to the earlier period, in the mid-1980s Kosovo Serb activists identified the problem as 
that of inter-ethnic inequality and the lack of security for Kosovo Serbs. They redefined 
their position as unjust, allocated blame for it to Kosovo’s party leadership and developed 
discourse related to human rights and, later, constitutional change, which set the stage for 
a broad mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs. However, it remains unclear why the framing of 
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ethnic grievances was successful in the mid-1980s and not in the previous decade. To 
explain the origins of nationalist mobilisation one must look beyond ethnic grievances.  
An important factor that conditions the survival of social movements in the face 
of opposition from political elites and other groups is the power of collective identities to 
provide links among activists and supporters that survive isolated episodes of collective 
action. Unlike many other social movements, contemporary nationalist movements need 
not build such an identity from scratch, as it is already available in the form of national 
identity. The resilience of nationalist movements in comparison with other movements 
comes from the presence of an emotional bond similar to that connecting members of a 
family, which is largely absent in other large social groups.32 The absence of formal 
organisations, which would normally impede the expansion of a movement, was 
compensated in the case of the Kosovo Serb movement by this emotional glue linking its 
activists and supporters.  
Kosovo, in history and epic, has been an important marker of national identity for 
the Serbs.33 For one thing, Kosovo was the heartland of the medieval Serbian polity and 
culture, the territory that still houses the most important historical and religious 
monuments of the Serbs. For another, the Kosovo legend has long served as a source of 
resistance to foreign rule and as a tool for preservation of ethnic and national identity. 
The legend, partly based on a medieval battle with the Ottomans (1389), says that the 
Serbian Duke Lazar chose martyrdom as a sacrifice for Serbia rather than servitude. It 
was created soon after the battle and had a central place in the evolving oral epic tradition 
of the Serbs during the following centuries. It served as a source of spiritual strength and 
determination to resist Ottoman rule and, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, as 
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inspiration for revenge and national liberation of the Serbs.34 The grass roots movement’s 
activists and supporters saw their current problems only as the last step in the long history 
of struggle for survival in the region and drew inspiration for their activities from battles 
that had been fought, in history or legend, by their ancestors. This also partly explains 
why so many of them were prepared to take the risks linked with collective action in a 
repressive political context. References to this abound in their appeals35 despite the 
movement organisers’ efforts to downplay this aspect for tactical reasons, to avoid being 
labelled counterrevolutionaries. In short, ancestral ethnic hatreds can hardly explain 
nationalist mobilisation. Grievances that arise from inter-ethnic inequalities and 
memories of lapsed conflicts as well as national identities account for the intensity of 
feelings involved in nationalist mobilisation and continuing support for collective action 
once it is under way. These factors, however, fail to explain the timing and dynamics of 
nationalist movements. For one thing, it remains unclear why the framing of ethnic 
grievances occurs on some occasions but not others. For another, mobilisation at times 
produces unexpected and unintended outcomes, in this case a disproportionate impact by 
a small peripheral movement on the political process at the centre. This indicates that we 
need an approach that is more sensitive to political factors. As political scientists who 
study nationalism are primarily concerned with politics that unfolds within institutions, I 







Political opportunities and repertoires and cycles of collective action 
 
Students of social movements and contentious politics have so far largely ignored 
contentious collective action related to nationalism.36 Contemporary research on the 
former, however, has much to offer to the understanding of nationalist mobilisation. In 
this section I employ the concepts of social movement theory, including those of political 
opportunities and repertoires and cycles of collective action, to demonstrate the decisive 
role that political context and the dynamics of contention play in the emergence, 
development and outcomes of nationalist movements. I show how the Kosovo Serb 
movement emerged and developed largely in response to changes in opportunities and in 
a political environment that was the least unfavourable to challenger groups in Eastern 
Europe. I also show that the broadening, survival and outcomes of the movement largely 
depended upon forms of action employed in protest and the movement’s temporal 
location in a broader protest cycle.  
 
Political opportunities  
The concept of political opportunities consists of dimensions of a movement’s 
political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s 
expectations for success or failure.37 It includes relatively stable aspects of a movement’s 
political environment and changes in opportunities.38 Regarding the former, cross-
national studies of collective action in contemporary Western democracies show that 
some states are more open to challenger groups than others according to the criteria of 
state structure and the state’s prevailing strategies towards collective challenges. The 
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impact of state structure is a function of territorial and functional decentralisation, since 
decentralisation, as opposed to centralisation, implies multiple points of access for 
challenger groups.39 Consequently, the states that are more likely to invite collective 
action are federations and states with extensive regional and local government and those 
featuring higher autonomy of branches of government and functional bodies.  
From the early 1970s Yugoslavia featured a highly decentralised political 
structure. A high level of decentralisation was in part the consequence of the introduction 
of Soviet-style national federalism after World War II. The creation of federal units and 
within them a party cadre based on titular nationality was the means of expansion of 
control over the politicisation of ethnicity.40 While the central state and party organs 
remained firmly in charge during the first two decades after the war, the Yugoslav 
leadership transferred considerable powers to federal units in the late 1960s and early 
1970s and the 1974 Constitution ended up as an uneasy mix of federal and confederal 
arrangements. Another source of the Yugoslav decentralisation drive was a local version 
of communist ideology, which was hostile to the idea of the state. In an attempt to 
distance themselves from the Soviet model after the break with Stalin, the Yugoslav 
leaders introduced workers’ self-management. The concept was later extended to the 
polity and social services, resulting in a high level of functional decentralisation. The 
concept of self-management was also directly tied to the territorial dimension of 
decentralisation and, as a result, Yugoslavia ended up with a highly decentralised 
political structure, including a weak centre, powerful federal units, a high level of local 
autonomy and a large number of official organisations and associations.  
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The decentralised political structure provided multiple targets for challenger 
groups, many of which did not exist in other socialist party-states, and resulted in the 
multiplication of elites.This in turn potentially opened space for conflict among leaders 
from different layers of the party-state and the emergence of allies of challenger groups. 
Prominent members of the Kosovo Serb movement were therefore able to shift the targets 
of their action strategically from local officials to the Kosovo authorities, and from 
Serbia’s to the federal leadership, according to changing political opportunities. As 
Kosovo officials ignored a number of local initiatives by Kosovo Serbs in the mid-1980s, 
the emerging movement turned to the federal authorities. Two years later, feeling that 
their demands had not been fully addressed at the federal level, the movement activists 
increasingly focused on Serbia’s leaders. Having gained their support, they targeted 
officials of the autonomous provinces in 1988. Such a gradual strategy could hardly have 
worked in a centralised non-democratic state and a more confrontational approach would 
have provoked immediate suppression of the movement. Also, slight variation in verbal 
responses by authorities at various levels to early protests from Kosovo Serbs gradually 
evolved into different strategies to contain the spread of protest and ended in sharp 
institutional conflict.  
The state’s prevailing strategy towards challenger groups maybe inclusive, that is, 
assimilative and facilitative of their entry into the polity, or exclusive, and its general 
strategy towards challengers may differ from its strategy regarding particular issues.41 
East European socialist party-states were very exclusive and repressive towards any 
collective challenges in comparison with democracies and even many non-democratic 
states in other regions. Although the Yugoslav party-state was less exclusive and 
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repressive than most in Eastern Europe, all attempts to extend the scope of protest outside 
narrow dissident circles, or to raise questions about the national question outside official 
discourse, were suppressed. This strategy was not without loopholes. Strong connection 
with the masses, rooted in the popular-based National Liberation Movement (1941–45), 
and emancipation of all ethnic groups featured high on the list of legitimising claims of 
the party. As a result, while there were strict limits to ideological dissidence, party-state 
officials could not easily dismiss appeals for fair treatment of a minority group, especially 
when it came from the grass roots. With respect to the stable dimensions of political 
opportunity, therefore, Yugoslavia provided a less unfavourable political context for 
collective challenges than any other East European state and this applied especially to 
non-ideological protest by grassroots groups.  
Regardless of the actual configuration of stable dimensions of political 
opportunity, ordinary people in most periods lack resources to seriously contest the power 
of political elites and only changes in opportunities may reduce this imbalance of 
resources and trigger collective action. Changes in opportunities include shifts in political 
alignments, divisions within and among elites and the emergence of allies of potential 
challenger groups. Breakdowns of long-standing coalitions of political elites and interest 
groups and elite conflicts encourage potential challengers with few internal resources to 
initiate protest and push parts of the elite to look for allies outside the polity.42 From the 
perspective of marginal groups, elite allies can provide organisational expertise or offer 
protection from repression, which is essential as challengers have access to few internal 
resources in non-democratic states.43  
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In the last years of Tito’s rule political stability in Yugoslavia rested on a political 
arrangement that emerged between 1972 and 1974, following the purges of reformist 
politicians. The loosening of a federal structure from the late 1960s and early 1970s was 
partly compensated, and the co-operation of regional elites achieved, through increasing 
role of the party in society and over state organs and Tito’s direct involvement in decision 
making. In this period Tito reasserted his role of the supreme arbiter in political struggles 
within republics and those among regional elites. Leadership succession, namely the 
death of Tito in 1980 and generational change in Serbia’s leadership in the early 1980s, 
sent tremors through the political system and undermined previously stable informal 
political alignments at the federal level and triggered divisions within and among political 
elites. While leadership turnover lacked routinisation in all socialist party-states, Tito did 
not leave a successor and Yugoslavia’s loose institutional structure effectively prevented 
the emergence of a new leader. Owing to long-delayed changes in leadership the 
succession also involved a rotation in political generations, just like in other East 
European party-states.44 Technocrats from the coming generation were much less bound 
by ideological restraints and, when fractional conflict reappeared, many looked for 
support from social actors outside the party-state.  
Recurrent fractional elite conflict was one of the important features of the politics 
of socialist party-states. Owing to the loose federal structure of Yugoslavia, the main 
outbursts of elite power struggle occurred within federal units. As the firm grip of 
ideology loosened, the conflicts within and among political elites of federal units became 
more frequent and observers outside the party-state became increasingly aware of the 
divisions. Only after repeated signals of the mounting pressure from Serbia’s and the 
23 
 
federal party leadership on Kosovo’s officials in the first half of the 1980s to address the 
concerns of Kosovo Serbs did some groups take the risk of initiating collective action. 
Later on, the movement’s organisers continued to exploit even the slightest 
disagreements within and among political elites. As the division grew within Serbia’s 
leadership in 1987 the movement activists extended their demands beyond the of.cial 
discourse. After signs of crisis in relations between leaders of Serbia and its autonomous 
provinces in 1988, they extended protests to Vojvodina and central Serbia, thus 
provoking a wave of mobilisation across Serbia and Montenegro.  
An important change in political opportunities was the shift in party policy 
towards Kosovo in the early 1980s as a consequence of the 1981 Kosovo Albanian 
demonstrations. The scale of protests surprised the authorities and raised fears of the 
emergence of a major separatist movement. In response the federal leadership unleashed 
severe repression of the militant groups and initiated a re-evaluation of its earlier policy 
towards Kosovo based on non-interference in internal affairs of the autonomous province. 
To justify the change of political course the federal leadership purged Kosovo’s 
leadership, pointed to excesses of Albanian nationalism and acknowledged inequalities 
facing the non-Albanian population. Kosovo Serb protesters exploited this opportunity 
and initially stated their demands largely within the official discourse.  
This partly explains why the early protests by the movement were not 
immediately suppressed and why the authorities were sensitive to its demands early on. 
Within this general framework, the federal and Serbia’s leaders had a more inclusive 
strategy towards the movement while Kosovo’s officials, directly engaged in the 
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suppression of Kosovo Albanian separatist groups, were much less ready to deal softly 
with any challenges.  
The emergence of allies in the mid-1980s provided resources to the Kosovo Serb 
grass roots groups to initiate and expand protest. Protest organisers kept close contact 
with reporters from Belgrade media located in Kosovo and occasionally consulted several 
dissident intellectuals from Belgrade and uninfluential delegates in the federal and 
Serbia’s assemblies about various issues. They sought information about relations within 
and among political elites and their possible reactions to protest actions as well as advice 
on strategy and tactics.45 Without the moderating influence of their allies, the protesters 
might have opted for radical solutions and, consequently, faced repression. The rise of 
Milošević´ to power also turned the fortunes of the movement as their protests were 
accepted as legitimate and prominent activists were shielded from repression. While 
seeking advice from various quarters, the movement organisers made decisions on 
strategy and tactics on their own. They firmly believed that people at the grass roots 
understood their problems best and were therefore able to make appropriate decisions.46  
Leadership succession and generational change also brought about the partial 
relaxation of repressive rules and regulations and increased space for political debates. In 
Serbia technocrats of the coming generation led by Stambolić gradually replaced 
members of Tito’s old guard and younger Kosovo Albanian politicians, led by Azem 
Vllasi, entered the higher ranks of a highly conservative Kosovo leadership. In short, 
during Tito’s rule the authority of the aging president, stable political alignments and the 
absence of major elite divisions and elite allies effectively discouraged potential 
challenger groups. The expansion of political opportunities in the early 1980s, including 
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the collapse of old political alignments, mounting elite conflict and the change of party 
policy towards Kosovo, increased the salience of a highly decentralised political structure 
and thus helped transform the potential for mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs into collective 
action.  
 
Repertoires and cycles of collective action  
The survival, expansion and outcomes of social movements, including nationalist 
ones, partly depend upon forms of action employed in protest. Protest strategies shape 
responses of political elites and other opponents and affect the level of popular support 
for challenger groups. Unlike democracies, which by definition tolerate a degree of 
contentious claim making, non-democratic states rarely tolerate popular protest. As a 
result, moderate forms of action, which are less likely to invite repression than 
confrontational ones, acquire special importance in non-democratic states. Moderate 
protest strategies and, especially, deliberate avoidance of violence open a limited space 
for interaction with a non-democratic regime without repression and this in turn may 
encourage potential supporters to join activities of an emerging movement.47  
Organisers of the Kosovo Serb movement opted for a moderate and gradual 
strategy from the very beginning. They exploited official procedures of the decentralised 
system and held frequent public meetings under the veil of the people’s front (called the 
Socialist Alliance of Working People) in towns and villages where Serbs constituted a 
substantial part of the local population. Having in mind the nature of the regime, the 
creation of a formal organisation was not an option and the semi-official character of 
public meetings to some extent protected protest organisers from repression. 
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Simultaneously, the protesters wielded non-institutional means to make their demands 
more credible before the party leadership. Lacking resources that come with formal 
organisation, the emerging network of activists in towns and villages inhabited by Serbs 
utilised inter-ethnic incidents as focal points to mobilise popular support and mount 
pressure on the authorities.48 From 1986 they organised small demonstrations or public 
meetings of the people’s front across Kosovo after assaults on Serbs by Kosovo 
Albanians or other extreme examples of insecurity or discrimination. This revealed that 
costs of protest in the ageing socialist regime were not as high as had been generally 
believed and encouraged potential supporters to join the activities.  
The movement organisers deliberately avoided violence and were determined to 
open a limited space for interaction with the authorities excluding repression. The only 
violent encounter occurred during the visit of Milošević to Kosovo Polje in 1987, when 
representatives of Kosovo Serb protesters were prevented from entering the public 
meeting with Serbia’s party leader. Likewise, very few movement activists demanded 
that the federal and Serbia’s authorities address their problems by repressing Kosovo 
Albanians. The movement’s organisers, in particular, believed that a police state, even 
with the intention of protecting Kosovo Serbs, would only aggravate the security situation 
for their community in the long term.49 That intentions and actions of Kosovo Serb 
protesters were often misinterpreted and seen only in retrospect through the prism of 
Milošević’s post-1989 repressive policies towards Kosovo Albanians partly stems from 
confusing the strategic use of non-violent methods with principled non-violence, such as 
paci.sm. While non-violent methods may be used out of deep religious or moral 
convictions, most practitioners of non-violence all over the world have used it for 
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pragmatic reasons, as the most effective tool to bring about political or social change 
within a particular context.50 That the movement organisers embraced non-violence for 
strategic reasons and did not reject repressive policies against Kosovo Albanians in 
principle but rather out of consideration of their negative consequences led some to 
believe that the movement somehow covertly demanded repression.  
The concept of repertoire of collective action implies the existence of a relatively 
limited, and culturally constrained, set of forms of action that people can choose from at a 
particular point in time and adapt to their immediate circumstances in the interaction with 
opponents. Continuity overtime rather than huge leaps in innovation of new forms of 
action is to be expected.51 Unsurprisingly, the forms of action that Kosovo Serb protesters 
employed initially, such as petitions and delegations, were those that their non-state allies 
had already practised. Priests and monks of the Serbian Orthodox Church had employed 
petitions to draw the attention of the authorities and the general public to the concerns of 
Kosovo Serbs, while dissident intellectuals had protested in this way against non-
democratic practices of the regime. Likewise, a few delegations of Kosovo Serbs had 
visited federal and Serbia’s officials in the early 1980s before the emergence of the 
movement.52 On the other hand, the choice of forms of action was shaped by the creative 
action of the movement’s leadership. The novelty of delegations sent since 1986 was that 
they were designed to make their demands known to the general public as much as to the 
party leadership. After the arrest of one of the movement leaders in April 1986 a three-
day long street demonstration was organised in response. Two months later, a large group 
of protesters set off on a protest march and threatened to collectively leave Kosovo. Two 
years later, having obtained powerful allies, the movement organisers opted for more 
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confrontational tactics, deliberately provoking Vojvodina’s leadership to use repression 
and thus open itself to criticism from the public and republican elites.  
The Kosovo Serb movement made a disproportionate impact on the subsequent 
political developments largely because its activists unintentionally initiated a broader 
mobilisation cycle. Cycles of contention, or phases of intensive conflict throughout a 
society, include diffusion of collective action, invention of new forms of contention, a 
combination of organised and unorganised participation, the creation of new action 
frames and intensive interaction between authorities and challengers.53 The impact of a 
movement on subsequent challenger groups largely depends on its temporal location 
within a cycle of contention. As an initiator movement the Kosovo Serb movement 
expanded political opportunities for others. Early protests by the movement in Vojvodina 
turned long-standing divisions among elites of republics and autonomous provinces into 
an open institutional conflict, breaking the public image of a unified political elite and 
reducing the capacity of the state for repression. The success of the movement in bringing 
its demands onto the government’s agenda pointed out the advantages of 
collectiveactiontovariouschallengersanditsprotestsprovidedmodels of action for similar, 
unrelated and opposing groups. Consequently, subsequent protests included issues 
concerning inter-ethnic relations, constitutional changes, accountability of political elites, 
expansion of political participation and higher wages. A small peripheral movement such 
as that of Kosovo Serbs could have such a disproportionate impact only at the beginning 
of a broader wave of mobilisation, when no other group employed contentious action. 
Kosovo Albanian protests of late 1988 and early 1989, despite a large number of 
participants, did not have such an immediate impact on the centre of Yugoslav politics 
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simply because they unfolded late in the cycle, when Serbia and Montenegro had already 
been in turmoil.  
In addition to immediate outcomes, the movement of Kosovo Serbs left a legacy 
that shaped strategies of similar and unrelated challenger groups in the following decade. 
This particularly affected strategies of popular protest in some of the few remaining Serb 
enclaves in Kosovo in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo war. While demanding physical 
protection from KFOR and UNMIK and showing determination to remain in Kosovo, 
activists of the new movement have employed old repertoires, including petitions, 
delegations, protest marches and demonstrations, and developed new ones, such as road 
blockades and violent interaction with both international protection forces and their 
Kosovo Albanian rivals. There was also a substantial cross-fertilisation of tactics, or 
‘learning from the enemy’, in the late 1980s. Following the example of the Kosovo Serb 
movement, early protests by Kosovo Albanians featured non-violent repertoires and their 
demands were stated in terms of the official discourse.  
Apart from the tactics, the mutual impact of collective action of Kosovo Serbs and 
Albanians was largely indirect. Collective action of challenger groups from the two 
communities did not occur simultaneously and they affected one another by influencing 
the political process at the centre, that is, by triggering changes in power relations among 
federal, Serbia’s and Kosovo authorities. As a consequence of the 1981 Kosovo Albanian 
demonstrations, Kosovo’s officials lost bargaining power in relations with federal and 
Serbia’s leaders which, along with other changes in opportunities, opened some space for 
collective action by Kosovo Serbs. Another round of redistribution of power among the 
elites of republics and autonomous provinces followed the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ 
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of 1988, which was initiated by the Kosovo Serb movement. The prospect of 
constitutional change in Serbia and the circumscribing of powers of autonomous 
provinces, along with other factors, opened space for collective action by Kosovo 
Albanians.  
In short, changes in political opportunities, including unstable political 
alignments, divisions within and among political elites and the emergence of allies, 
increased the salience of Yugoslavia’s highly decentralised political structure and the 
sensitivity of the party leadership to the concerns of Kosovo Serbs and thus opened up 
space for limited protest in the mid-1980s. Moderate strategies of grass roots activists 
secured the survival and entrenchment of the movement among Kosovo Serbs and their 
sustained protests had a considerable impact on subsequent political developments. The 
movement’s action expanded political opportunities for other groups, provided models of 
action for new arrivals and left a lasting legacy of protest politics in the region. The 
emergence, development and outcomes of nationalist movements can therefore hardly be 
explained without insights from social movement theory, particularly without the focus 
on how stable and changing elements of the political context condition the emergence and 





The advantages of combining insights from social movement theory and 
nationalism studies should now be apparent. The study of nationalist movements requires 
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a closer look into the substantive content of the issues involved, that is, grievances that 
arise from inter-ethnic inequalities and memories of earlier conflicts, and national 
identities. These factors account for the intensity of feelings and continuing support for 
contentious action once it is under way but fail to explain the timing and dynamics of 
nationalist movements. For this reason, the study of the origins and trajectories of 
nationalist movements requires insights from social movement theory. Changes in 
political opportunities within a particular configuration of state structure and state 
strategies condition the emergence and dynamics of collective action. Whether incipient 
nationalist movements survive the interaction with political elites and sustain popular 
support partly depends on their protest strategies. Like other social movements, 
nationalist movements rarely appear in isolation and often develop together with other 
movements and unorganised participation, forming cycles of contention. Consequently, 
nationalist movements should be studied as a species of social movements.  
Too often students of Yugoslavia have focused on ethnic grievances and 
primordialist or instrumentalist attitudes of elites and counter-elites and ignored political 
context and dynamics of contention. The findings from this article suggest that stable and 
changing dimensions of political context, mobilisation and the interaction of non-state 
actors and political elites played an important role in shaping political developments in 
Yugoslavia in the late 1980s. It appears that unintended outcomes of the Kosovo Serb 
movement, including diffusion of contention to various groups, inclusion of new actors in 
the political process and changing state–society relations that took place only in a part of 
the country, had a destabilising impact upon the loose federal structure of socialist 
Yugoslavia. It may well be that a nationalist discourse became politically significant at 
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the centre only as a product of the political process of disintegration of the socialist 
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